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Abstract
Background:  The 2003 revision of the UK GMS contract rewards general practices for
performance against clinical quality indicators. Practices can exempt patients from treatment, and
can receive maximum payment for less than full coverage of eligible patients. This paper aims to
estimate the gap between the percentage of maximum incentive gained and the percentage of
patients receiving indicated care (the pay-performance gap), and to estimate how much of the gap
is attributable respectively to thresholds and to exception reporting.
Methods: Analysis of Quality Outcomes Framework data in the National Primary Care Database
and exception reporting data from the Information Centre from 8407 practices in England in 2005
– 6. The main outcome measures were the gap between the percentage of maximum incentive
gained and the percentage of patients receiving indicated care at the practice level, both for
individual indicators and a combined composite score. An additional outcome was the percentage
of that gap attributable respectively to exception reporting and maximum threshold targets set at
less than 100%.
Results: The mean pay-performance gap for the 65 aggregated clinical indicators was 13.3% (range
2.9% to 48%). 52% of this gap (6.9% of eligible patients) is attributable to thresholds being set at
less than 100%, and 48% to patients being exception reported. The gap was greater than 25% in 9
indicators: beta blockers and cholesterol control in heart disease; cholesterol control in stroke;
influenza immunization in asthma; blood pressure, sugar and cholesterol control in diabetes;
seizures in epilepsy and treatment of hypertension.
Conclusion: Threshold targets and exception reporting introduce an incentive ceiling, which
substantially reduces the percentage of eligible patients that UK practices need to treat in order to
receive maximum incentive payments for delivering that care. There are good clinical reasons for
exception reporting, but after unsuitable patients have been exempted from treatment, there is no
reason why all maximum thresholds should not be 100%, whilst retaining the current lower
thresholds to provide incentives for lower performing practices.
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Background
Pay for performance (PfP) incentives were introduced to
UK primary care in 1991. These were initially limited to
vaccinations, immunizations and cervical cancer screen-
ing. The new GMS contract introduced in 2004 repre-
sented a major change to general practice funding, with a
substantial increases in PfP for quality indicators, deliv-
ered through a quality and outcomes framework (QOF)
based on the best available research evidence [1]. It is a
large investment in UK primary care, with an estimated
cost of £1.8 billion each year [2]. In the first year of con-
tract implementation, these quality payments accounted
for approximately 25% of a typical GP principal's pay [3].
Consequently delivery of care has changed and there is
evidence that quality has increased in the contract condi-
tions but not in other areas of quality care outside the con-
tract [4].
Practices are rewarded for performance based on quality
indicators, which initially covered 10 clinical domains
and aspects of practice organisation, patient experience
and enhanced services. The clinical indicators in the new
GMS contract are listed in Additional file 1. More than
half the incentive points are allocated to clinical perform-
ance (550 out of 1050). There has been a gross payment
of £124.60 per point since 2005/6, based on a typical
practice of 5500 patients with a typical prevalence of dis-
ease. Practices in England achieved higher results than
expected by the NHS Employers negotiating team, gaining
an average of 96% of the maximum points [3]. There is a
mechanism for adjusting payment to each practice based
on the prevalence of disease for each indicator, though
this adjustment may not reflect the workload of a practice
with a significantly different prevalence from the average
[5]. At first glance the achievement of practices gaining
almost all of the incentive payments available suggests
close to maximum performance at targeting patients at
risk: but maximum points and payment can be gained in
every clinical indicator before all eligible patients receive
indicated care.
There are two mechanisms which reduce the percentage of
eligible patients that practices need to treat in order to
receive maximum incentive payments. First, 'exception
reporting' allows clinicians to exclude patients from the
treatment indicated by a clinical indicator. Exception
reporting is an important process because clinicians
should not be put under pressure to prescribe inappropri-
ately to achieve an indicator. Appropriate reasons for
exception reporting have been agreed between the Depart-
ment of Health and the British Medical Association and
these are comprehensive (Table 1) [1]. 5.55% of patients
were 'exception reported' by English practices in 2005/6
[6]. There is substantial variation between practices in
exception reporting rates, with 5.4% of practices exceed-
ing an average exception reporting rate of 10% [6].
The second mechanism which reduces the percentage of
eligible patients that practices need to treat in order to
receive maximum incentive payment is the presence of
target thresholds set at less than 100%. For each clinical
indicator there is a graduated scale of payments from a
minimum to maximum threshold. A practice achieves
maximum points payments at thresholds lower than
100% coverage of patients eligible for all interventions,
with the lowest threshold for maximum payment being
50% (indicator CHD 10) and the highest threshold being
90% in 37 indicators (Table 2). These thresholds were
described as the "maximum practically achievable level to
deliver clinical effectiveness" [1]. No definition of 'practi-
cally achievable' was given, and it was not intended to be
the same as 'clinically desirable'. Importantly, once the
maximum threshold is reached there is no financial incen-
tive to treat more eligible patients. Of course doctors per-
form for other than financial reasons, and many (though
not all) practices exceed the maximum target thresholds
despite there being no additional payment for doing so.
An example of the way in which this payment scheme
operates is indicator LVD 3, the percentage of patients
with a diagnosis of CHD and left ventricular dysfunction
Table 1: Agreed criteria for exception reporting
A Patients who have been recorded as refusing to attend review who have been invited on at least three occasions during the preceding twelve 
months
B Patients for whom it is not appropriate to review the chronic disease parameters due to particular circumstances e.g. terminal illness, extreme 
frailty
C Patients newly diagnosed within the practice or who have recently registered with the practice, who should have measurements made within 
three months and delivery of clinical standards within nine months e.g. blood pressure or cholesterol measurements within target levels
D Patients who are on maximum tolerated doses of medication whose levels remain sub-optimal
E Patients for whom prescribing a medication is not clinically appropriate e.g. those who have an allergy, another contraindication or have 
experienced an adverse reaction
F Where a patient has not tolerated medication
G Where a patient does not agree to investigation or treatment (informed dissent), and this has been recorded in their medical records
H Where the patient has a supervening condition which makes treatment of their condition inappropriate e.g. cholesterol reduction where the 
patient has liver disease
I Where an investigative service or secondary care service is unavailableBMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:131 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/131
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Table 2: Threshold targets and maximum payments
Clinical indicator Maximum points payment Payment stages (min-max thresholds)
CHD 2 7 25–90%
CHD 3 7 25–90%
CHD 4 4 25–90%
CHD 5 7 25–90%
CHD 6 19 25–70%
CHD 7 7 25–90%
CHD 8 16 25–60%
CHD 9 7 25–90%
CHD 10 7 25–50%
CHD 11 7 25–70%
CHD 12 7 25–85%
LVD 2 6 25–90%
LVD 3 10 25–70%
STROKE 2 2 25–80%
STROKE 3 3 25–90%
STROKE 4 2 25–70%
STROKE 5 2 25–90%
STROKE 6 5 25–70%
STROKE 7 2 25–90%
STROKE 8 5 25–60%
STROKE 9 4 25–90%
STROKE 10 2 25–85%
BP2 10 25–90%
BP3 10 25–90%
BP4 20 25–90%
BP5 56 25–70%
DM 2 3 25–90%
DM 3 3 25–90%
DM 4 5 25–90%
DM 5 3 25–90%
DM 6 16 25–50%
DM 7 11 25–85%
DM 8 5 25–90%
DM 9 3 25–90%
DM 10 3 25–90%
DM 11 3 25–90%
DM 12 17 25–55%
DM 13 3 25–90%
DM 14 3 25–90%
DM 15 3 25–70%
DM 16 3 25–90%
DM 17 6 25–60%
DM 18 3 25–85%
COPD 2 5 25–90%
COPD 3 5 25–90%
COPD 4 6 25–90%
COPD 5 6 25–90%
COPD 6 6 25–70%
COPD 7 6 25–90%
COPD 8 6 25–85%
EPIL 2 4 25–90%
EPIL 3 4 25–90%
EPIL 4 6 25–70%
THY2 6 25–90%
CANCER2 6 25–90%
MH2 23 25–90%
MH3 3 25–90%
MH4 3 25–90%
MH5 5 25–70%BMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:131 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/131
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who are currently treated with ACE inhibitors, where the
minimum threshold that triggers payment is 25%. There
is a sliding scale of increasing payment up to a maximum
of 10 points achieved at 70% uptake of the target popula-
tion. The combination of exception reporting and low tar-
gets reduce the potential health gain from an indicator, as
a practice always achieves maximum incentive points in a
particular indicator before all eligible patients have
received treatment. This is because all maximum target
thresholds are set below 100% population coverage and
this target is applied after exception reported patients have
been excluded.
The objectives of this paper are:
1. To estimate the gap for each indicator between the per-
centage of maximum incentive gained, and the percentage
of patients who receive indicated care.
2. to estimate how much of the gap is attributable respec-
tively to thresholds for maximum payment set at less than
100%, and to exception reporting.
Methods
Thresholds for maximum payments were obtained from
the 2003 GMS contract [1]. Data on points gained and
reported quality performance for each clinical indicator in
all English practices for the year 2005/6 were obtained
from the National Primary Care Database. The contract
has 76 clinical indicators. Exception reporting rates for 65
clinical indicators in all English practices for the year
2005/6 were obtained from the NHS Information Centre.
Exception reporting is not applicable to the remaining 11
indicators as they refer purely to setting up disease regis-
ters that are used to define the population eligible for the
65 indicators.
The 'gap' was computed for each indicator for all patients
by calculating the difference between the percentage of
incentive gained and the percentage of patients who
received treatment. To compute the size of the gap attrib-
utable to the threshold targets the exception reporting rate
was deducted from the total gap for each indicator. The
computations used to determine the numbers of patients
receiving care are displayed in Table 3. Ethical approval
was not needed for this study as all data was available in
the public domain.
Results
The pay-performance gap for each indicator, and the
amount of this gap attributable to exception reporting and
target thresholds respectively are given in Table 4. At the
indicator level, the mean pay:performance gap for the 65
indicators was 13.3% (s.d. 9.8). The pay:performance gap
was greater than 25% in nine indicators, which included
indicators with interventions with significant health gain.
ASTHMA 2 15 25–70%
ASTHMA 3 6 25–70%
ASTHMA 4 6 25–70%
ASTHMA 5 6 25–70%
ASTHMA 6 20 25–70%
ASTHMA 7 12 25–70%
Table 2: Threshold targets and maximum payments (Continued)
Table 3: computations for the pay performance gap.
For all practices {i = 1...I} and indicators {j = 1...J}:
Number of patients eligible for treatment before exceptions, Nij
Number of patients receiving treatment, Xij
Number of exceptions, Eij
Exception reporting rate (proportion), Eij/Nij = eij
Actual quality performance score before exceptions, qij = Xij/Nij
Reported quality performance score after exceptions, qR 
ij = Xij/Nij - Eij
Rearranging gives Xij = qR 
ij * (Nij - Eij)
Therefore actual quality performance 
Pay score, pij = (actual pay/maximum pay) for practice i and indicator j
Pay-performance gap for practice i and indicator j, gij = pij - qij
Pay-performance gap for indicator j, gj = ∑i pij - qij
Pay-performance gap for practice i, gi = ∑j pij - qij
qq NEN
qE N
qe
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R
ij ij ij
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These pay:performance gaps were respectively; 48% for
beta blockers in heart disease, 43% for glucose control in
diabetes, 35% for cholesterol control after a stroke, 34%
for influenza immunization in asthma, 30% for blood
pressure control in diabetes, 29% in seizure control in epi-
lepsy, 29% in cholesterol control in diabetes, 29% in cho-
lesterol control in heart disease and 26% in blood
pressure control in hypertension.
Thresholds below 100% account for 52% of the pay:per-
formance gap, and exception reporting accounts for the
remaining 48% of the pay:performance gap. Figure 1
shows the top 15 indicators with the largest pay:perform-
ance gap and the separate contribution made by exception
reporting and thresholds.
Discussion
This is the first study of its kind to examine the gap
between the percentage of financial incentive gained by
each practice and the percentage of patients in that prac-
tice who receive indicated care. The strength of this study
is that it uses data routinely collected from every practice
in England for each clinical indicator which has exception
reporting data. The mean gap between the percentage of
maximum incentive that a practice receives and the per-
centage of eligible patients receiving care is 13.3%. This
gap exceeds 25% in nine indicators. Five of these nine
indicators with the largest pay-performance gap have an
evidence base linking them to reductions in mortality.
These five indicators are beta-blockers in heart disease
(relative risk reduction 24%) [7], glucose control in diabe-
tes (relative risk reduction 36%) [8], blood pressure con-
trol in diabetes (relative risk reduction 35%) [9],
cholesterol control in heart disease (relative risk reduction
24%) [7] and blood pressure control in hypertension (rel-
ative risk reduction 16%) [19]. In all of these indicators
the target threshold being set at less than 100% has con-
tributed significantly to this gap between the financial
incentive gained and number of patients receiving treat-
ment.
The implication of these findings is that maximum target
thresholds set at less than 100% may be contributing to
reducing health gain for patients. Maximum target thresh-
olds account for 52% and exception reporting accounts
for 48% of the pay-performance gap respectively. It seems
unlikely that such a large gap can be attributed to patients
who are clinically unsuitable or unwilling to accept care
pay: performance gap for top 15 indicators Figure 1
pay: performance gap for top 15 indicators.
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Table 4: Mean pay: performance gap by indicator
Clinical indicator Mean pay: performance gap % Standard deviation % of gap attributed to exception 
reporting
% of gap attributed to target 
thresholds <100%
CHD 2 11.7 13.6 11.4 0.3
CHD 3 4.6 3.3 1.6 3.0
CHD 4 5.4 5.7 2.7 2.7
CHD 5 3.5 2.7 1.3 2.2
CHD 6 16.2 6.7 4.1 12.1
CHD 7 8.2 4.4 3.4 4.8
CHD 8 29.0 8.6 10.2 18.8
CHD 9 8.2 3.8 3.6 4.6
CHD 10 48.0 9.0 25.2 22.8
CHD 11 17.1 11.2 7.3 9.8
CHD 12 17.6 6.0 10.7 6.9
LVD 2 10.2 15.0 10.3 -0.1
LVD 3 19.0 11.2 7.6 11.4
STROKE 2 15.1 13.6 10.8 4.3
STROKE 3 6.3 4.5 2.8 3.5
STROKE 4 9.6 10.2 3.5 6.1
STROKE 5 5.1 4.1 2.2 2.9
STROKE 6 19.9 8.6 6.7 13.2
STROKE 7 10.4 7.3 6.2 4.2
STROKE 8 34.8 11.6 14.7 20.1
STROKE 9 9.1 6.0 4.9 4.2
STROKE 10 20.1 8.1 13.4 6.7
BP2 4.3 2.8 1.6 2.7
BP3 2.9 3.0 0.7 2.2
BP4 7.3 2.8 1.0 6.3
BP5 25.7 6.8 5.5 20.2
DM 2 7.8 4.4 3.5 4.3
DM 3 4.0 3.0 1.7 2.3
DM 4 5.8 5.7 3.2 2.6
DM 5 6.3 3.9 3.3 3.0
DM 6 43.4 10.3 12.7 30.7
DM 7 13.6 5.4 6.5 7.1
DM 8 10.2 7.7 6.5 3.7
DM 9 9.6 7.3 6.3 3.3
DM 10 9.6 7.6 6.4 3.2
DM 11 3.3 2.7 1.6 1.7
DM 12 30.4 9.5 8.0 22.4
DM 13 9.8 11.4 7.6 2.2
DM 14 6.1 3.9 2.6 3.5
DM 15 13.7 12.6 5.3 8.4
DM 16 6.7 3.8 2.9 3.8
DM 17 29.0 8.1 10.6 18.4
DM 18 19.9 6.6 13.2 6.7
COPD 2 10.2 11.5 9.4 0.8
COPD 3 10.4 9.9 8.4 2.0
COPD 4 5.2 4.2 2.3 2.9
COPD 5 4.9 5.9 2.5 2.4
COPD 6 17.8 12.4 9.1 8.7
COPD 7 8.4 7.5 5.5 2.9
COPD 8 16.7 7.5 11.0 5.7
EPILEPSY 2 6.2 6.6 3.6 2.6
EPILEPSY 3 6.2 6.6 3.5 2.7
EPILEPSY 4 29.1 17.2 17.4 11.7
THYROID2 4.2 3.2 0.7 3.5
CANCER2 11.1 10.2 9.2 1.9
MH2 7.7 9.6 5.0 2.7
MH3 4.7 10.0 4.2 0.5
MH4 6.4 15.6 3.4 3.0
MH5 12.2 14.7 8.1 4.1BMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:131 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/131
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for their condition as these patients should be accounted
for by exception reporting. The combination of exception
reporting and threshold targets set below 100%, while
perhaps thought to be overambitious before implementa-
tion, appears now to be in danger of producing an incen-
tive ceiling effect, where maximum payment is received
for less than maximum coverage of the eligible popula-
tion. This could reduce the health gain from the new GMS
contract as we have observed both high exception report-
ing rates and low target thresholds in some indicators
with significant intermediate health gain outcomes.
Exception reporting is patient specific and has the advan-
tage of being sensitive to patients needs when it is used
appropriately. The agreed criteria for exception reporting
are wide ranging and will cover most circumstances where
patients are not suitable for a particular indicator. Since
primary care has achieved maximum points in many
areas, there may be no rationale for maximum target
thresholds to be set below 100% as there are comprehen-
sive reasons for exception reporting any patient who
would not theoretically benefit from the indicated care. In
the 2006/7 revision to the GMS contract several of the
maximum thresholds have been increased to 90%,
though lower maximum thresholds still persist for several
clinical indicators [11].
This work adds significant new information to previous
published work on exception reporting and UK primary
care. One study based in 1024 Scottish general practices
found that when exception reporting is taken into account
there was lower delivered quality of care in less affluent
practices in 4 clinical indicators [12]. A further study
based in one English primary care trust found higher
exception reporting rates in diabetic populations with
higher deprivation [13]. These 2 studies differ from ours
in that we studied the effect of target thresholds on the
percentage of patients receiving indicated care, as well as
exception reporting. We used actual rather than estimated
exception reporting data. We included a significantly
larger number of practices (8407), and included all 65
clinical indicators for which exception reporting occurs,
where as McClean et al included 33 indicators and Sigfrid
et al included 15 indicators.
Conclusion
The combination of both exception reporting and target
thresholds set at less than 100% lead to a misalignment of
incentives in the GMS contract for UK primary care, where
maximum incentive payment is reached before all eligible
patients have received appropriate treatment or health
care intervention. There is a high exception reporting rate
in several indicators with significant intermediate health
outcomes which also have low maximum target thresh-
olds. The policy implication is that all maximum target
thresholds should be set at 100%, whilst retaining the cur-
rent lower thresholds to provide incentives for lower per-
forming practices. Appropriate exception reporting is
likely to be unavoidable and necessary, and should be
retained for patients unsuitable for a particular indicator.
Incentive payments would then be provided for 100% of
eligible patients in the population.
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Table 4: Mean pay: performance gap by indicator (Continued)Publish with BioMed Central    and   every 
scientist can read your work free of charge
"BioMed Central will be the most significant development for 
disseminating the results of biomedical research in our lifetime."
Sir Paul Nurse, Cancer Research UK
Your research papers will be:
available free of charge to the entire biomedical community
peer reviewed and published  immediately upon acceptance
cited in PubMed and archived on PubMed Central 
yours — you keep the copyright
Submit your manuscript here:
http://www.biomedcentral.com/info/publishing_adv.asp
BioMedcentral
BMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:131 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/131
Page 8 of 8
(page number not for citation purposes)
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Andrew Wagner, the National PCT database and the 
Information Centre for providing data for analysis. Dr Fleetcroft is given 
protected time from Gt. Yarmouth and Waveney PCT for study.
References
1. Department of Health: New GMS Contract 2003. Investing in
general practice.  NHS Confederation and the British Medical Associa-
tion. London 2003.
2. Roland M: Linking physician pay to quality of care: a major
experiment in the United Kingdom.  N Eng J Med 2004,
351:1448-54.
3. Information Centre 2006. Press release "Online GP practice
results database. Quality and Outcomes Framework for GP
practices"   [http://www.qof.ic.nhs.uk/]. Accessed 28 05 2007
4. Steel N, Maisey S, Clark A, Fleetcroft R, Howe A: Quality of clinical
primary care and targeted incentive payments: an observa-
tional study.  British Journal of General Practice 2007,
57(539):449-454.
5. Guthrie B, McLean G, Sutton M: Workload and reward in the
quality and outcomes framework of the 2004 general prac-
tice contract.  British Journal of General Practice 2006, 56:836-841.
6. Information Centre 2007. Quality and Outcomes Frame-
work exception report   [http://www.ic.nhs.uk/statistics-and-dat-
collections/audits-and-performance/qof/quality-and-outcomes-frame
work-exception-report]. Accessed 09 09 07
7. National Institute for Clinical Excellence: Prophylaxis for patients
who have experienced a myocardial infarction: drug treat-
ment, cardiac rehabilitation and dietary manipulation.  Lon-
don NICE; 2001. 
8. Adler A, Stratton I, Neil H, Yudkin J, Matthews D, Cull C, et al.:
UKPDS 36: Association of systolic blood pressure with
macro vascular and micro vascular complications of type 2
diabetes (UKPDS 36): prospective observational study.  BMJ
2000, 321:412-419.
9. UK Prospective Diabetes Study (UKPDS) Group: Effect of inten-
sive blood-glucose control with metformin on complications
in overweight patients with type 2 diabetes (UKPDS 34).  Lan-
cet 1998, 352:854-86.
10. Mulrow C, Lau J, Cornell J, Brand M: Pharmacotherapy for hyper-
tension in the elderly.  Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews
1998:CD000028.
11. NHS Employers and the BMA: Revisions to the GMS contract
2006/7. Delivering investment in general practice.  N H S
Employers Company Ltd. London; 2006. 
12. McLean G, Sutton M, Guthrie B: Deprivation and quality of pri-
mary care services: evidence for persistence of the inverse
care law from the UK Quality and Outcomes Framework.
Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 2006, 60:917-922.
13. Sigfrid LA, Turner C, Crook D, Ray S: Using the UK primary care
Quality and Outcomes framework to audit health care
equity; preliminary data on diabetes.  Journal of Public Health
2006, 28(3):221-225.
Pre-publication history
The pre-publication history for this paper can be accessed
here:
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/131/pre
pub